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LOVE IS ALL YOU NEED: THE SUPREME COURT CLARIFIES 
THE STANDARD FOR TIPPER–TIPPEE LIABILITY UNDER 
INSIDER TRADING 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Regulation of the securities market resulted from the industry’s 
growing importance in the economy and the corrupt culture of dishonesty 
that resulted in unfairness.1 That was in the 1930s but still holds true 
today; the size of the finance industry is significant,2 and insider-trading 
networks are prevalent, grossing nearly $1 billion over the past four 
years.3 To curb insider trading, securities law prohibits individuals from 
making undisclosed trades based on material nonpublic information 
(MNI).4 Such individuals may be corporate insiders, owing a fiduciary 
duty to their shareholders, or outsiders, owing a duty of “trust and confi-
dence” to the source of the information.5 These individuals can also face 
liability for disclosing MNI to others who then trade on it, but only if the 
tipper received a personal benefit.6 
The Supreme Court recently clarified in Salman v. United States 
what constitutes a personal benefit in order to hold a tipper liable for 
insider trading.7 In a nutshell, the Court held that a tangible exchange 
between the tipper and tippee for MNI is unnecessary to find liability.8 
While many commentators will be disappointed because the new stand-
ard lacks clarity and inconsistent holdings will continue, the Court cor-
rectly sided with fairness in the securities market and properly acknowl-
edged that “[d]etermining whether an insider personally benefits from a 
particular disclosure, a question of fact, will not always be easy for 
courts.”9 
II. BACKGROUND 
The Court formulated the personal benefits test in Dirks v. SEC.10 
The case concerned corporate insiders who tipped a security analyst to 
  
 1. Sara Almousa, Friends with Benefits? Clarifying the Role Relationships Play in Satisfying 
the Personal Benefit Requirement under Tipper-Tippee Liability, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1251, 
1252 (2016). 
 2. See Robin Greenwood & David Scharfstein, The Growth of Finance, 27 J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES 3, 3 (2013). 
 3. Almousa, supra note 1, at 1251. 
 4. Id. at 1253. 
 5. Id. at 1257–58 (explaining the classical and misappropriation theories of liability). 
 6. Id. at 1259.  
 7. Salman v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 420 (2016). 
 8. Id. at 429. 
 9. Id. (citing Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 (1983)). 
 10. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664. 
2 DENVER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94 
expose fraud.11 Because the disclosure was for a corporate purpose, dis-
closing fraud, and not a personal purpose, the Court found no liability.12 
The Court noted that the personal benefits test should focus on objective 
criteria to determine whether the tipper received a personal benefit from 
the disclosure, such as a “pecuniary gain or reputational benefit that will 
translate into future earnings.”13 The Court also noted that a personal 
benefit can be inferred from facts and circumstances, such as “when an 
insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or 
friend.”14   
Dirks received much criticism, partly because it resulted in many 
inconsistent holdings throughout the nation.15 Many questioned whether 
it was necessary under Dirks that there be an objective, tangible ex-
change for MNI or if it was sufficient that the tipper and tippee be friends 
or family. If the latter, how close should the relationship be and what 
constitutes a personal benefit? Courts were thus unsure what the standard 
was to find a personal benefit and what role the nature of the relationship 
between a tipper and tippee should be.16 After a circuit split, the issue 
reached the Supreme Court. 
In United States v. Newman, the original tipper was a corporate in-
sider who tipped an analyst MNI about a company’s nonpublic earn-
ings.17 The analyst disclosed to another analyst, who in turn tipped 
Newman.18 Newman argued that the original tipper did not personally 
benefit from the disclosure because he received no tangible benefit for 
his tip.19 The Second Circuit agreed, holding that the original tipper did 
not receive any tangible personal benefit and rebutting the government’s 
argument that career advice and reputational benefits were sufficient.20 
In United States v. Salman, the original tipper was an investment 
banker who tipped his brother MNI about impending mergers and acqui-
sitions.21 The brother tipped his brother-in-law, Salman, who traded on 
the information.22 Salman argued that Newman applied and there was 
insufficient evidence that the original tipper received a tangible benefit in 
  
 11. Id. at 667. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 663. 
 14. Id. at 664. 
 15. Nicholas Morgan, Thomas A. Zaccaro & Jenifer Q. Doar, Salman v. US: Will It Change 
the “Personal Benefit” Test?, Law360 (August 3, 2016), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/823740/salman-v-us-will-it-change-the-personal-benefit-test [here-
inafter Morgan].  
 16. Almousa, supra note 1, at 1252. 
 17. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 443 (2nd Cir. 2014).  
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 444. 
 20. Id. at 452 (noting that if general career advice and friendship were sufficient personal 
benefits, then practically anything would qualify).  
 21. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1088 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 22. Id. 
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exchange for tipping his brother.23 The Ninth Circuit held that proof of a 
tangible benefit is not required under Dirks and that the intention of the 
original tipper to convey the information as a gift was sufficient.24 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari for the Salman decision and 
affirmed.25 The Court held that tipping MNI to a relative or friend consti-
tutes a gift and satisfies the personal benefits test because it is the same 
as if the tipper traded and relayed the profits to the tippee.26 The Court 
“resolve[d] [this] narrow issue” by adhering to the language in Dirks.27 
The Court held further that it disagreed with Newman “[t]o the extent 
that the Second Circuit held that [a] tipper must also receive something 
of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature in exchange for a gift to fami-
ly or friends.”28 
III. DISCUSSION 
The Court’s decision settles the question whether a tangible ex-
change is required to satisfy the personal benefits test. Difficulties and 
dissatisfaction will persist, however, because the Court provided little 
guidance to determine what constitutes a personal benefit in the absence 
of a tangible exchange, which requires an assessment of the relationship 
between the tipper and tippee. In other words, courts and juries will have 
to determine whether facts and circumstances allow the inference that a 
tipper disclosed MNI as a gift to “a trading relative or friend.”29   
The Court did little but emphasize that Dirks is good law and pro-
vides sufficient guidance to find a tipper liable.30 Ascertaining whether 
the type of relationship between the tipper and tippee satisfies the per-
sonal benefits test, therefore, will require a case-by-case analysis. The 
Court recognized this difficulty but concluded it was worth the effort to 
prevent insider trading.31 
Developing case law will provide guidance to the courts regarding 
the types of relationships that satisfy the personal benefits test. Case law 
already generally finds that the personal benefits test is satisfied even 
when the tipper did not receive a pecuniary or reputational gain.32 Cases 
will thus come down to whether there is sufficient evidence to prove that 
  
 23. Id. at 1093. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Salman, 137 S.Ct. at 429.  
 26. Id. at 427–28.  
 27. Id.  
 28. Id. at 429 (finding it inconsistent with Dirks). 
 29. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664. 
 30. See Walter Pavlo, SCOTUS Weighs In On Insider Trading To Get Us Back Where We 
Started, FORBES (Dec. 8, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/walterpavlo/2016/12/08/scotus-
weighs-in-on-insider-trading-to-get-us-back-where-we-started/#6d3a68c1b43c.  
 31. Salman, 137 S.Ct. at 429 (noting that determining whether a tipper benefits from a disclo-
sure will not always be easy for the courts). 
 32. Almousa, supra note 1, at 1268. 
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a tip was made to benefit a relationship between the tipper and tippee.33 
Courts will also benefit in remembering the distinction between disclos-
ing information for corporate purposes and for personal gain.34 
Prohibiting insider trading ensures that individuals do not profit 
from information that belongs to the corporation. Had the Court sided 
with Salman and found that the personal benefits test always required a 
tangible exchange, albeit providing a clearer standard, would have re-
sulted in allowing some insider trading to go unchecked.35 It would have 
meant, for example, allowing Salman to incur no liability from his $1.5 
million profit, despite the only reason for his financial success being his 
relationship to his brother.36 Thus, the Court correctly held that a tipper 
who relays MNI to a trading relative or friend is sufficient to find liabil-
ity for insider trading.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
The financial industry’s prominence in the economy requires re-
straint against its abuses. Insider trading ensures that certain individuals 
do not personally profit from misappropriating MNI that properly be-
longs to the company. By holding that it is not required that a tipper ob-
tain a tangible benefit in return for his disclosure of MNI, prosecutors 
can now charge traders whose only reason for profiting is their privileged 
position and relationships.  
Tony Arias* 
  
 33. Id. at 1272. 
 34. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 653–54; see also Donald C. Langevoort, Investment Analysts and the 
Law of Insider Trading, 76 VA. L. REV. 1023, 1024 (1990) (noting disclosures to analysts are typi-
cally not unlawful because they serve a variety of corporate purposes, such as enhancing the compa-
ny’s standing with the investor community or strengthening existing lines of communication).  
 35. See Morgan, supra note 15 (mentioning Salman’s argument that failing to require an 
objective exchange would result in an “indeterminate” standard and provide grounds for prosecutori-
al overreach). 
 36. Salman, 137 S.Ct. at 421–22.  
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